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Abstract
The minimum-effort coordination game, having potentially important implications in both evolutionary
biology and sociology, draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma
is often inconsistent with the predictions of classic game theory. In the framework of classic game theory,
any common effort level is a strict and trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium, so that no desideratum is
provided for selecting among them. Behavior experiments, however, show that the effort levels employed
by subjects are inversely related to the effort costs. Here, we combine coalescence theory and evolution-
ary game theory to investigate this game in finite populations. Both analytic results and individual-based
simulations show that effort costs play a key role in the evolution of contribution levels, which is in good
agreement with those observed experimentally. Besides well-mixed populations, set structured populations,
where the population structure itself is a consequence of the evolutionary process, have also been taken into
consideration. Therein we find that large number of sets and moderate migration rate greatly promote effort
levels, especially for high effort costs. Our results may provide theoretical explanations for coordination
behaviors observed in real life from an evolutionary perspective.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In game theory, coordination games are a class of games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria
in which players choose the same or corresponding strategies [1–5]. For those macroeconomists
who believe that an economy may become mired in a low-output equilibrium, the coordination
game is a particularly important paradigm [6, 7]. It is also worth noting that coordination game
has a potentially important application to evolutionary biology [6, 8, 9]. In addition, the coor-
dination model helps to explain the puzzle why cooperative behavior can emerge when only the
fittest survive: for example, punishment, an important mechanism that restricts selfish behavior,
in fact transforms social dilemmas (such as prisoner’s dilemma game or public goods game) into
coordination games [10–13].
In the minimum-effort coordination game (MECG), which captures key features of the kinds
of coordination problems faced by firms, the common part of the payoff is determined by the
minimum decision [1, 14–18]. Two players choose “effort levels” from an available strategy set
and both have to perform a costly task to raise the joint production level. Each player’s payoff is the
minimum of the two efforts minus the cost of its own effort. When a player with an effort level p1
encounters an opponent with p2, the former gains the payoff P(p1, p2) = min(p1, p2) − κp1, where
κ < 1 is a cost parameter. Apparently, any common effort constitutes a Nash equilibrium, and
without further refinement the Nash equilibrium concept provides little predictive power [1, 16, 19,
20]. The lowest effort level corresponds to the least efficient or risk-dominant equilibrium and the
highest effort level corresponds to the Pareto-optimal or payoff-dominant equilibrium [1, 14, 15].
In the classic game theory, the set of Nash equilibria is obviously unaffected by changes in the
effort cost or the number of players [1, 14, 16].
However, in the MECG experiments, the observed behaviors deviate from the results predicted
by game theory [21]. In general, the cost parameter κ plays a decisive role in the effort level:
Behavior is concentrated close to the highest effort level when κ is low, whereas high values of
κ lead to a dramatic declining of the mean contribution level. In some behavior experiments, al-
though coordination can be improved by introducing other interaction mechanisms [22–25], large
cost continuously obstructs the stabilization of high level efforts. It is noteworthy that standard
deterministic evolutionary game theory [26], as well as classic game theory, can not present ex-
planations for this paradoxical results either, since any common effort level is a strict Nash equi-
librium and hence a stable equilibrium point for the replicator equations [27, 28]. To explain
2
the behavior found empirically in the MECG, a variety of theoretical approaches have been pro-
posed. Stochastic learning models were investigated to explain the anomalous behavior observed
in the MECG [14, 15]. Anderson [16] extended Rosenthal’s analysis [29, 30] to a MECG with
a continuum of actions and used the logit probabilistic choice framework to determine a unique
“logit equilibrium”. Recently, Iyer and Killingback studied the evolutionary dynamics of these
games through individual-based simulations on complex networks, showing that the evolutionary
behaviors are in good agreement with those observed experimentally [8].
In this work, we study the MECG with mixed strategies [31–33] from the perspective of the
evolutionary balance between selection and mutation. Drawing lessons from coalescence the-
ory [34, 35], we can well resolve the problem which effort levels are more abundant than others
under any mutation rates. In the well-mixed situation, analytic results show that high effort lev-
els can be favored when the effort cost is small, and the opposite is true when the cost is large,
which is in accordance with behavior experiments and does not require extra notion of cognition
or rationality. More importantly, human society is organized in forms of various sets [35, 36], and
the outcome of an evolutionary process in a structured populations (such as games on variety of
networks [37–40], sets [35, 36] or phenotype space [34, 41]) can be very different from that in
well-mixed populations. Therefore we utilize evolutionary set theory to investigate the extended
model that individuals only interact with others who are in the same set. It seems that more sets
always enhance effort levels with all other conditions equal. This is ascribed to the fact that group
structure supports the evolution of “within-group helping” [42, 43]. Meanwhile, moderate extent
of random migration between sets effectively boosts mean contribution level [35].
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our model and methods, Sec. III
presents, analyses and discusses the results, and Sec. IV draws conclusions.
II. MODEL AND METHOD
A. Basic model of the MECG
Within this work, the basic model is a minimum-effort coordination game (MECG). Here we
consider the two-person game with a strategy set Φ. Without loss of generality, we set Φ = [0, 1].
We specify an individual i’s strategy as pi ∈ Φ. Let P(p1, p2) be the payoff that strategy p1
gets from strategy p2, P(p1, p2) = min(p1, p2) − κp1. More specifically, P(p1, p2) is given by the
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function:
P(p1, p2) =

(1 − κ)p1, if p1 ≤ p2;
p2 − κp1, if p1 > p2.
(1)
where κ is the cost parameter.
B. MECG in well-mixed populations
At first we consider the simple but general situation of well-mixed population without any
structure. In the population that consist of N individuals, each one plays the MECG with every
other one and they all get payoffs according to the function above. We express the fitness of
player i as an exponential function of the total payoff, i.e., fi = exp(sPi), where s is the intensity
of selection and Pi is i’s total payoff accrued through pairwise interactions with all others once.
In this frequency-dependent Moran process [44], at each time step an individual i is selected for
reproduction proportional to its fi. Reproduction is subject to mutation: The offspring inherits the
strategy of the parent with probability 1 − u and with probability u it adopts a strategy selected
uniformly at random. A strategy p is favored overall in the mutation-selection equilibrium if its
abundance exceeds the mean.
In well-mixed population, we only concentrate on the situation that strategies are continuous.
We use the result in Ref. [31] to derive that, for weak selection (s → 0) and large population size
N, strategy p is favored by selection if L˜p + NuH˜p > 0, where
L˜p =
∫ 1
0
{P(p, p) + P(p, q) − P(q, p) − P(q, q)}dq, (2)
H˜p =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
{P(p, r) − P(q, r)}dqdr. (3)
Here P(·, ·) is defined in Eq. (1) and p, q, r stand for strategy values. L˜p and H˜p are both functions
of the unique variable p. Meanwhile, to determine which strategy is most favored by selection,
one simply has to maximize L˜p + NuH˜p. Substituting Eq. (1) into Eqs. (2) and (3), we find the
condition for strategy p in MECG to be favored by selection to be
L˜p + NuH˜p = −
Nu
2
p2 + [(1 − κ)Nu + (1 − 2κ)]p + (κ
2
−
1
3
)Nu + (κ − 1
2
) > 0. (4)
We can obtain the most common strategy p by maximizing L˜p + NuH˜p in inequality (4).
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C. MECG in set structured populations
In this extended model, a population of finite size N is distributed over M sets and each individ-
ual belongs to one set. The sets could be geographical islands but they could also be phenotypic
traits or tags [45]. Two individuals interact only if they are in the same set (have the same tag).
Successful sets attract more individuals. In addition, in the mutation-selection analysis, besides
strategy mutation u, a set mutation rate v is introduced to represent individuals’ random migration
between sets. The update rule is similar to that in well-mixed population. It is useful to consider
the rescaled mutation rates, µ = Nu and ν = Nv, in the theoretical analysis.
When available strategies in the evolutionary process are discrete and the total number is n, for
simplicity, we utilize the n×n payoffmatrix A = [ai j] (i, j = 1, · · · , n) to describe payoffs between
any two discrete strategies. Here, ai j = P(pi, p j), where P(·, ·) is defined in Eq. (1). Drawing
lessons from Ref. [45], we acquire that a strategy pm(m = 1, · · · , n) is favored by selection if
λ1(amm − a∗∗) + λ2(am∗ − a∗m) + λ3(am∗ − a) > 0, (5)
where am∗ =
∑
j am j/n, a∗m =
∑
j a jm/n, a∗∗ =
∑
j a j j/n, and a¯ =
∑
i
∑
j ai j/n2. In addition, drawing
supports from coalescence theory, up to the same positive constant factor,
λ1 ∝ (1 + ν)(3 + µ + ν)(M(2 + µ)(3 + 3µ + 2ν) + ν(4 + 3µ + 2ν)), (6)
λ2 ∝ M(2 + µ)(9 + 3µ(4 + µ) + 6ν + 5µν + ν2)
+ ν(3µ3 + 2(2 + ν)(3 + ν)2 + µ2(21 + 8ν) + µ(49 + ν(38 + 7ν))), (7)
λ3 ∝ µ[M(2 + µ)(9 + 3µ(4 + µ) + 7ν + 5µν + 2ν2)
+ ν(34 + 3µ3 + 40ν + 2ν2(8 + ν) + µ(3 + ν)(16 + 7ν) + µ2(21 + 8ν))]. (8)
When strategies are continuous, using the result in Ref. [36] derived by Fu et al., we get that
strategy p is more abundant than the mean frequency if
λ1
∫ 1
0
[P(p, p)−P(q, q)]dq+λ2
∫ 1
0
[P(p, q)−P(q, p)]dq+λ3
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
[P(p, r)−P(q, r)]dqdr > 0. (9)
Here the λi terms are the same as for the discrete strategies, and P(·, ·), p, q, and r follow the same
definition as in Eq. (2) and (3).
D. Individual-based simulations
Individual-based simulations are used for the support of this weak selection analytical calcula-
tions. Meanwhile, with this tool, we can investigate how the average effort evolves across a wide
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range of selection strengths. In our simulations, individuals interact in a population of constant
size N = 100. Each individual’s strategy is initialized randomly at the beginning of the simulation,
and the strategies of all individuals are recorded over 109 generations.
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. MECG in well-mixed populations
In the weak selection limit where all individuals have roughly the same reproductive success,
it is possible to analytically derive which strategy is most frequent. In the well-mixed populations
without any structure, by maximizing L˜p + NuH˜p in condition (4), we find that the most common
strategy pM follows: 
κ ≤ 12 :

pM = 1 (if Nu ≤ 1−2κκ )
pM = (1−κ)Nu+(1−2κ)Nu (if Nu > 1−2κκ )
κ > 12 :

pM = 0 (if Nu ≤ 2κ−11−κ )
pM = (1−κ)Nu+(1−2κ)Nu (if Nu > 2κ−11−κ ).
(10)
As is shown in Fig. 1, the effort cost κ plays the decisive role in determining pM: For small κ
(κ < 1/2), natural selection most favors individuals who are willing to contribute a higher level
(pM > 1/2) ; Whereas large κ (κ > 1/2) leads to the prevalence of low pM (pM < 1/2). pM
monotonically increases with the decreasing of effort cost, according with economic intuition and
patterns in laboratory data [1, 2]. For low mutation rates, at most two strategies are involved in
the population. When κ < 1/2 the fully contribution strategy p = 1 behaves better than any
another strategy, thereby remaining the most abundant; When κ > 1/2, the risk-dominant strategy
p = 0 prevails. Conversely, for high mutation rates, all strategies have almost equal frequencies
throughout evolution, and the strategy contributing p = 1 − κ occupy a position of prominence in
this strategy-coexistence state. Intrudingly, despite the strategy mutation rates, pM sustains at the
level of 0.5 for the critical cost value κ = 0.5, resembling a “ neutral state”.
We next evaluate the impact of selection intensity s on the strategy distributions in the low
mutation case. Sufficiently small u assures that a single mutant vanishes or fixes in a population
before the next mutant appears, therefore the population is homogeneous most of the time [46].
Thus besides individual-based simulations, embedded Markov chain [47, 48] can be utilized here
to describe the evolutionary dynamics. Simulation results, in good agreement with the analytical
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results, show that strengthening s does not alter the most common strategy pM, but enhances the
advantage of pM . When κ > 1/2 the average contribution level of the whole population decreases
with the increment of s (see Fig.2 (a), (b)), and the opposite is true for κ < 1/2 (see Fig.2 (c), (d)).
If the imitation strength is considered to be a measure of how precise people’s information is in
learning [49, 50], it seems that information transparency drives the majority of individuals to make
a choice between the “worst” Nash outcome pM = 0 and the “best” equilibrium pM = 1, critically,
relying on whether the effort cost is large.
Drawing support from individual-based simulations, we have further studied how the average
effort evolves across a wide range of selection strengths and mutation rates. Some view points
above have been strengthened in this more general case. As shown in Fig. 3, for small s, all the
average strategies are close to 0.5, their neutral values. As s increases, the average efforts are
determined primarily by cost parameter κ. κ < 1/2 leads to the fact that the mean contributions
are always more than a half and ascends as s rises. On the contrary, κ > 1/2 causes a detrimental
effect to whole populations’ efforts with increasing s. Strategy mutation, introducing randomness
into selection, always inhibits the mean strategy from converging to the extreme states “fully
cooperation”(p = 1) or “complete defection” (p = 0).
B. MECG in set-structured populations
Furthermore, we are interested in how individuals behave in the MECG if they are located
in different groups and they do not play with out-group members. Here, Successful sets attract
members, and individuals may adopts a random set with probability v, called migration rate, sim-
ilar to strategy mutation u. This extended model can be investigated using evolutionary set the-
ory [35, 36]. Initially, we concentrate on the simple case of only two strategies p1 and p2, where
p1 > p2. In well-mixed populations, irrespective of any choosing intensity s or mutation rate u,
κ > 1/2 determines that p1 always performs worse than p2. However, “in-group favoritism” may
greatly facilitate p1, if
I , (1 − κ)λ1 − κλ2 + (12 − κ)λ3 > 0, (11)
which can be obtained by substituting Eq. (1) into condition (5) when the total number n of
available strategies is 2 (Correspondingly the size of matrix A is 2 × 2 ). For small strategy
mutation (µ = Nu → 0), I > 0 can be further simplified as
I1 , (1 − κ)λ1 − κλ2 > 0. (12)
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As shown in Fig. 4(a), for large effort cost κ > 12 and high migration rate ν = Nv ≫ 11−κ , condition
I1 > 0 leads to
M >
(2κ − 1)ν
2(1 − κ) , (13)
showing the minimum requirement for M to ensure that p1 prevails over p2. As µ increases, more
sets are required for sustaining p1 at a higher level than p2 (see Fig. 4 (b)-(d)). In this sense,
for large cost parameter κ either elevating µ or ν (when ν is large ) undermine the evolution of
contribution level, but increasing M always boosts effort. This can be attributed to the fact that
more sets enhance the opportunity of the clustering of higher level strategy (p1) to resist against
the invasion from the lower level strategy (p2), even under unfavorable conditions (κ > 1/2).
Moreover, in the weak selection limit, we investigated the MECG with continuous strategy set
Φ = [0, 1]. A global mutation model, in which an offspring mutant adopts a strategy randomly
and uniformly drawn from the unit interval Φ, is utilized to arrive at the analytical results. Using
inequality (9), We deduce that natural selection favors strategy p if and only if
C(p) , −λ3
2
p2 + [(1 − κ)λ1 − κλ2 + (1 − κ)λ3]p
−
1 − κ
2
λ1 +
κ
2
λ2 + (κ2 −
1
3)λ3 > 0. (14)
Similarly, the most abundant strategy pM can be obtained by maximizing C(p). Interestingly, for
small strategy mutation µ → 0, the fully contribution behavior (pM = 1) is most favored if I1 > 0
(inequality (12)) holds; Otherwise the majority choose to invest nothing (pM = 0). The optimum
level pM is presented in Fig. 5 across a wide range of µ, ν and M. Obviously, κ also plays the key
role in determining pM (compare Fig. 5(a)-(c) with (d)-(f)). The evolution of pM is prominently
promoted by increasing M, especially for large κ, as shown in Fig. 5(a)-(c). However, low values
of set mutation rate ν, which can be treated as failure in distinguishing sets, keeps individuals from
adopting high effort levels (note the lower parts of Fig. 5(a)-(c)). In addition, moderate ν, equipped
with small µ, is capable of maximizing pM even when κ > 1/2 (see the left parts of Fig. 5(b)(c)).
We are also interested in whether the average strategy frequency 〈p〉 of the whole population can
exceed the neutral level for large κ. Drawing supports from Ref. [36], we can conclude that the
condition which ensures 〈p〉s→0 > 1/2 is∫ 1
0
pC(p)dp > 0 (15)
which also leads to I > 0 (inequality (11)), coinciding with the two strategies case. The feasible
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regions of combinations of M and ν, where the whole population incline to contribute a higher
level on average, are also presented in Fig. 4.
Last, under moderate selection intensity, by computer simulations we show the impacts of M
and migration rate ν on average effort respectively. Low κ facilitates effort, in accordance with
above analysis. For κ > 1/2, the average effort ascends sharply with M when M < 100, then
stabilizes at a level slightly above 1/2. As shown in Fig. 6(b), there is an optimal level of ν
promoting the effort level. As mentioned in Ref. [36], without flexibility in group identity (ν → 0)
individuals reside in the same sets forever. On the other hand, excessively high values of ν make
the association between strategy and group membership breaks down.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the minimum-effort coordination game, any common effort constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Without further refinement, the Nash equilibrium concept provides little predictive power. How-
ever, experimental data show that efforts are much lower when effort is more costly, or when there
are more players [1–3]. To explain the inconsistency, we bring together ideas from coalescence
theory and evolutionary game dynamics, to investigate how effort levels evolve in a mutation-
selection process.
In the well-mixed situation, analytical results show that effort cost is the primary factor in deter-
mining contribution levels, which is in accordance with experimental data. Meanwhile, changing
imitation intensity can not alter the most common strategy here, different from the case in the
TDG [49]. When selection is weak, the dynamics depends greatly on the strategy mutation rate
u. The most common strategy adopted by players converges from the highest contribution level
(when κ < 1/2) or the lowest contribution level (when κ > 1/2) to 1 − κ as u increases.
Furthermore, populations are structured by geography or other factors [35]. Individuals usually
can only interact with those in the same set or group. Therefore evolutionary set theory is utilized
to study evolutionary dynamics of MECG in structured populations. It seems that more sets and
moderate migration rate can effectively promote effort levels, especially when the costs are large.
Since higher effort levels in MECG may be considered to represent more cooperative strategies [8],
our finding strengthens the viewpoint that the structure of the population allows “cooperative”
strategies to “cluster” in certain sets to resist the invasion of the “defective” ones. This also helps
to explain why optimal coordination level is sometimes achieved even if the cost is very large in
9
human society.
The MECG is of considerable practical importance since many interesting and significant real-
world situations can be modeled by such games [6, 8]. We hope our observations could help to
explain how coordination behaviors evolve in a variety of real life situations.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The most common strategy as a function of the strategy mutation rate (in terms of
the expected number of mutants per generation, Nu) in the weak selection limit. N is the total population
size and u is the strategy mutation rate. When the effort cost κ is small, “cooperative” strategies are most
common. When κ is large, the opposite is true.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The strategy distributions in the low mutation case for different effort cost κ and
selection strength s values. The average strategy for each distribution is marked by a double-headed orange
arrow, while the most common strategy marked by a single-headed red arrow. Results are averaged over
more than 3 × 109 time steps. Red lines correspond to analysis results calculated by embedded Markov
chain. Other parameters are N = 100, u = 0.0001.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The average effort level as a function of the selection strength for different combi-
nations of κ and u, determined by individual-based simulations. Shown are time-averaged values over 109
generations, using the population size N = 100.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) (a) The minimum requirement for set number M above which higher effort level is
favored as a function of ν = Nv. (b)-(d) The feasible regions (colorful regions) for higher effort level to
prevail over lower effort level in dependence on both ν and M, for different combinations of κ and µ = Nu.
Color bar shows exact values of I in condition (11). The population size is N = 100.
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FIG. 5: (Color online)Influence of µ = Nu and ν = Nv on most common strategy for different values of
κ and M. (a)-(c) corresponds to high effort cost parameter κ = 0.7 (κ > 0.5). (d)-(f) refers to low effort
cost parameter κ = 0.3 (κ < 0.5). Color bar shows the exact values of the most common effort levels. The
population size is N = 100.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The average effort level as a function of (a) set number M and (b) migration rate v,
obtained by individual-based simulations. Increasing group numbers M enhances “cooperation”,especially
for large κ. However, moderate migration rate promotes average effort level. Parameters: (a) N = 100,
s = 0.01, u = 0.01, v = 0.1, (b) N = 100, s = 0.01, u = 0.01, M = 15. Results are averaged over 109 time
steps.
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